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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
ANNET·TE HARROP,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

Oase No.

9868

ALFRED BECKMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks damages
for personal injurie'S suffered by her when she was struck
by a boat owned and operated by the defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWEH COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict and
judgment fror plaintiff defendant appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent asks only that this Court affirm the
judgment of the Trial Court.
ST.AT'EMENT OF FACTS
On July 24, 1958, Plaintiff, Annette Harrop, then 20
years of age, was water skiing at the E.ast Canyon Reservoir in S:alt Lake County (R. 47, 77). The day was hot
and sunny (Ro 51). Testimony at the trial varied as, to
the condition of the water at the scene of the accident.
Plaintiff testified that the water was calm, but that
waves caused hy the boat which had been pulling her
were 5· to 6 inches high (R. 78, 86). D·efendant, and other
witnesses called by defendant, testified that there was
a 15 mile per hom wind (R. 91) and that the waves were
8 to 12 inches high (R. 101, 117) o At approximately noon
time she fell from her water s:kis (R. 47-49) Because
of the fact that she was wearing a life jacket she floated
with her head .and shoulders out of the water (Ro 134).
After falling she attempted to retrieve her skis, which
were floating near her approximately 13 feet apart (R.
136-137) 0 On the same day defendant, Alfred Beckman,
was operating an outboard motor boat which was approximately 14 feet long, 4¥2 feet wide, and weighed
approximately 550 pounds (Ro 91)0 At the time of the
accident he w:as pulling one water skier, and two persons
were in the boat with him (Ro 92) o Plaintiff testified that
after she had been in the water approximately one minute (Ro 48, 66), and had failed to retrieve either of her
0
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skis (R. 136), she heard a s.cream, looked up, and saw a
boat with the operator and two girls in it, and the operator had his head turned back (R. 47). She raised heT
arm to protect herself, but was struck by the bo:at, the
force of the impact forcing her down into the water (R.
47). Defendant and his companions turned their boat
around, picked her up, and took heT to the shore. She
was bleeding from the head and arm (R. 49'). On shore
a crowd gathered, and as plaintiff was lying on the grass
the defendant said, "Oh, I didn't even see her, I hit her"
(R. 49). Defendant, and a witness called by him, denied
that this statement was made (R. 106, 124). Defendant
testified that he was traveling at approximately 20 miles
per hour, about 50 feet from the shore line at the time
of the accident, and indicated that he was approximately
80 feet from the plaintiff when he saw her for the first
time (R. 101). He did not immediately recognize the
object as a hwnan head, but when he did realize what it
was, he swung the boat to the left and cut the engine
(R. 101-102, 107). Plaintiff was struck on the head and
arm by the right side of the boat (R. 111, 134). At the
moment of impact defendant had driven the boat 150
feet in a straight line, without any turns (R. 109). At
the time ·of the accident there· were between 30 and 50
boats on the re·servoir (R. 48, 94), but there were no other
boats in the immediate area (R. 93, 83, 133).
Mter instructing the jury, the court submitted a
verdict to them in the form of spe'<~ial interrogatories.
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Two of the questions propounded, .and the answers given
by the jury are as follows ( R.133):
"Proposition 1: The defendant was negligent
in not kHeping a proper lookout : Yes.
"Proposition 2: ·The Plaintiff was contributo·rily negligent while she was in the water by
not keeping a proper lookout: No."

Appellant raises six points on appeal, but eondensed, they raise only three issues : Negligence, 'Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk. Argument in
this brief will be limited to those three basic issues.
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

The issues of law raised in the motion for directed
verdict and the motion for new trial are those previously
mentioned: Negligence, Contributory Negligence, and
Assumption of Risk Detailed argument on these points
will he found under points two, three and four. However,
it should be stated at this stage in the argument, that
in denying these motions the trial court was following
the policy of the Supreme Court, set forth in Webb vs.
Olin Mathieson Chemical Co'l"poration, 9 Utah 2d 275,
342 P. 2d 109·4, 1101 (1959):
"It is the declared policy of this court to
zealously protect the right of trial by jury and
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nort to take issues from them and rule .as a matter
of law except in clear cases."
As will be pointed out later, the instant case contained conflicting evidence concerning the .actions that
each of the parties contend will prove negligence or contributory negligence. The issues, therefore, were properly
submitted to the jury.
POINT 2
THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE WAS
PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, AND THERE IS
SUF,FI'CIENT EVIDENCE TO UPHOLD THE JURY'S FINDING 'THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT.

Unless the question of negligences is free from
doubt, the Court cannot pass upon it as a question of
law. If the court is in doubt whether reasonable men
might arrive at different conclusions, then this very
doubt determines the question to be one of fact for the
jury and not one of law for the court. Webb vs. Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corpo~ation, supra. The question
of negligence is one of fact for the jury reg.ardle,ss of
whether the uneertainty occurs because of a conflict of
evidence or because from the facts, men might honestly
draw different conclusions. Y oshitoJiro Okuda vs. Rose,
5 Utah 2d 39, 296 P. 2d 287 (1956). In other words, negligence is a question for the jury unless all reasonable
men must draw the same conclusion from the facts as
they are shown. Charvoz vs. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d 25, 361
P. 2d 516 (1961); Jensen v.s. DO'len, 12 Utah 2d 399, 367
p. 2d 191 (1960); Best vs. Huber, 3 Utah 2nd 177, 281
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6
P. 2d 208 (1955). Particularly where the witness-es are
parties having an interest in the action, the circumstances
should he evaluated hy the jury, in whose province lies
the power to believe or disbelieve the testimony and evidence, to ·observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and to
draw such reasonable conclusions from the whole record
as may be warranted. M orby v.s. Rogers, 122 Utah 5-!0,
252 P. 2d 231 (1953). In order for the Court to grant a
request for .a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, grounded on non negligence of the defendant, the record must disclose no evidence against the
party so requesting, upon which reasonable minds could
find lrim guilty of the negligence charged. M orby vs.
Rogers, supra.
There is no conflict in the evidence and no denial
that the accident did occur, that defendant's boat struck
the plaintiff causing her injury. Plaintiff testified that
at the time of the accident defendant's head was turned
aw.ay from his direction of travel, and she also testified
that -after she was removed from the reservoir, and was
lying on the .grass, the defendant stated that he hadn't
seen her. D-efendant and other witnesses deny these facts,
but the f.act remains that she was there to be seen for at
le·ast one minute, and she was not seen until it was too
late to avoid hitting her. There was therefor, sufficient
evidence, if believed, from which to find the defendant
negligent. There was a conflict in some of the evidence,
and the- jury, being present in court, observed the candor
and demeanor ·of the witnesses, and chose which to be-
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lieve. In answer to the question propounded to them
concerning the negligence of the defendant they answered that he was negligent in not keeping proper lookout. T'here is ample evidence to justify this finding.
POINT 3
THE ISSUE OF PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WAS PROPERLY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY AND
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO UPHOLD THE
JURY'S FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.

As is the case with the question of negligence, contributory negligence is a question for the jury unless all
reasonable men must draw the s.ame conclusions from the
facts as they are shown. Rogalski vs. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 3 Utah 2d 203, 282 P. 2d 304 (1955); Moore vs. Miles,
108 Utah 167, 158 P. 2d 676 (1945). See also Glenn vs.
Gibbons & Reed Co., 1 Utah 2d 308, 265 P. 2d 1013 (19'54).
In order to be guilty o£ contributory negligence as a
matter of law the evidence must be undisputed and the
facts must not be conflicting and must clearly prove that
one acted in a manner in which a reasonable prudent
person would not have acted under the circumstances,
or that one failed to act in such a manner as a reasonable
prudent person would have acted under the circumstances. Allison vs. McCarthy, 106 Utah 278, 147 P. 2d
870 (1944). Only in a clear case, where all reasonable
minds would agree, should the issue of contributory negligence be taken from the jury. Compton vs. Ogdevn Union
Ry. Depot Co., 120 Utah 453, 235 P. 2d 515 (1951). In
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determining whether this plaintiff is contributarily negligent as a matter of law, :the evidence and all reasonable
inferences therefrom must be viewed in ·a light most
favorable to her. Roach vs. Kyremes, 116 Utah 405, 211
P. 2d 181 (19-49).
Contrary to what defendant argues, plaintiff did not
put herself in a positron of peril. She voluntarily went water skiing, but she did not voluntarily fall.
After she had fallen she attempted to retrieve her skis,
which were floating in the water around her. She had
been in .the water for approximately one minute when
she was struck. It is true that she did not wave her anns
or raise .a water ski in the air, obviously for the reason
that she had not yet retrieved the skis. Also, in comparing a boat moving at 20 miles per hour and a swimmer floating in the water, such a swimmer is absolutely
helpless, and .any attempt on her part to avoid being hit
by the boat, would be an impossibility. All of these facts,
circumstances, and possibilities were properly before the
jury, for it cannot be said that all reasonabJe minds would
draw the same cooclusrons concerning what actions were
reasonable or unreasonable under those ·circumstances.
The jury must have felt that her actions were reasonable
under the circumstances, since they responded to the
question put to them by the Court, that plaintiff was not
contributorily negligent. There is ample evidence to support this finding.
~oluntarily

POINT 4
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ASSUME THE RISK OF DEFENDANT'S INDEPENDENT A'CT OF NEGLIGENCE.
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Contrary to Appellant's contentions, plaintiff did
not request that the jury be alllowed to deliberate on the
issue of Assumption of Risk. Plaintiff asked for the
following instruction (R. 4-5):

INSTRUCTION NO. 18
One is said to assume a risk when she voluntarily manifests her assent to dangerous conduct,
or to the creation or maintainence of a dangerou8
condition, and voluntarily exposes herself to that
danger; or when she knows, or in the exercise of
ordinary care would know that danger exists in
either the conduct of another or in the condition,
use or operation of property, and voluntarily
places herself, or remains, within the position of
danger.
One who has thus assumed a risik is not entitled to recover for damage caused her without
intention and which results from the dangerous
condition or conduct to which she thus exposed
herself.

INST·RUOTION NO. 20
One who embarks upon the sport of water
skiing assumes only the normal risk incident to
skiing on the water behind a boat. She does not
assume the risk of an independent act of negligence by the operators of other boats in or ·about
the water.
INSTRUCTION NO. 21
You are instructed that in the case at hand
the plaintiff did not assume the ris:k o'f being injured in the manner she claims, and you should
not consider the defense of ass.um·ption of risk in
your deliberations.
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The Court correctly refused to give these instructions, .and the instructions requested by defendant on
.assumption of risk, since the evidence at the conclusion
of the trial did not justify the instructions.
Assumption of risk requires knowledge by plaintiff
of a specific defect or dangerous condition caused by
defendant's negligence or lack of due care, which plaihtiff
could have, but voluntarily and deliberately failed to
avoid. Ferg1Mson vs. Jongsma, 10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P. 2d
404 (1960). Under no stretch of the imagination can it
be said that plaintiff had :lmowledge that defendant would
act in the negligent manner that he did. Plaintiff had no·
knowledge of the dangerous condition until she heard the
scream and looked up to see the boat practically upon
her, with the defendant looking ·away from the direction
of travel. 'This Court has not had before it ·a case with
similar circumstances. In fact, only one other case in
the United States can be found involving the negligence
of an operator of a motor boat, who had injured a fallen
water skier. N'ugen vs. Hildebrand, 114 S.E. 2d 896 (W.
Va. 1960), was an action for personal injuries sustained
by the plaintiff when he fell while water skiing, and was
struck by the propeller of a boat owned and operated by
the defendant. The jury returned a verdict· in favor of
the pJaintiff in the amount of $50,000.00. The accident
had occured on a "pond" where approximately 20 to 30
motor boats were on the water during the day. However,
at the time of the accident only three boats were on the
"Pond." Plaintiff had fallen several times during the
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day, since he was new on water skis. The case was similar
to the instant case in its conflicting testimony. One witness testified that the defendant stated that plaintiff was
so close when he fell off that he, the defendant, -could not
avoid hitting him. The defendant denied making such a
statement. The following contentions were made on appeal:
1. The evidence failed to establish primary negligence as a matter ·of law.

2. Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as
a matter o[ law.
3. Plaintiff assumed the risk of the injury and was
barred from recovery.
The Supreme Court of West Virginia, having no
other cases as precedent, held that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. The
case does not make clear whether or not the queS!tion
of assumption of risk went to the jury, but we can presume that it did, and that the jury found in favor of the
plaintiff. However, the Nugen case does not hold that
the question of assumption of risk must go ·,to the jury,
as contended by defendant. In Appellant's brief he has
cited the Nugen case and has quoted the Syllabus by the
Court, which, in part, reads as follows :
"The Supreme Court of Appeals, Browning,
President, held tlu:t t evidence presented questions
for the jury as to primary negligence, proximate
cause, contributory negligence and assumption of
risk."
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The Court's opinion does not discuss the question of
assumption of risk, as b~ing a question for the jury, so
the syllabus cannot be relied upon for authority, we must
look to the opinion. In dis-cussing the doctrine of As sump~
tiou of Jtj.sk as it applied to the case, the court at 114
S.E. 2d 896, 900, made the following statements :
"Although the plaintiff was guilty of no negligence he would be barred from recovery if he
had voluntarily assumed the, risk of a !known
hazard and his injury resulted therefrom."
"The plaintiff in this case may have assumed
the normal risk incident to skiing on the water
behind the Foose boat, but he did not assume the
risk of -an independent act of negligence by the
defendant."
The Court therefore affirmed the finding 'Of the jury.
'The_ N ugen case, therefore, is directly in point with
the instant case. There is probably no question but what
plaintiff assumed the normal risk incident to water s!kiing
behind a boat. Had she been injured in her fall from her
water skis, had she collided with the boat that was pulling
her, or had she beeome entangled with the tow rope, she
could be said to have assumed the risk of such an aooideDJt. However, it cannot be said that she could have
expected another boat to strike her while she was floating in the water after falling from her skis, for such an
.act- was an independent act of negligence of the defandant, and .not to be expected. She did not, therefore, assume that risk, 'and should not be barred from recovery.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment of
the Trial Court should be affirmed and that she should
have her costs on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. ALLEN
630 Judge Building
Bait Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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